McDonald's China, together with its four major suppliers announced the launch of an industrial park in Xiaogan city, Central China's Hubei Province on Wednesday, highlighting the importance of Chinese market in terms of supply chain for food business. With a combined investment of 1.5 billion yuan ($206 million), the park, named Hubei Smart Food Industrial Park, is a joint project with Bimbo QSR, XH Supply Chain, Tyson Foods Inc, and Zidan, according to information provided to the Global Times. The park is expected to produce 34,000 tons of meat products, 270 million buns, 30 million pastries, and 2 billion packaged products annually. It also features a 25,000-square-meter high-standard automated warehouse for frozen, refrigerated, and dry goods, reducing logistics time by 90 percent from manufacturing to arriving at the destination. Leveraging local geographical advantages, the park will become a supply hub for McDonald's in central and western China, enhancing supply efficiency and stability for its outlets there, the company said. "McDonald's has been deeply rooted in China for over 30 years, and the park is an echo of our long-term development in China," said Phyllis Cheung, CEO of McDonald's China. "Without any long-term strategy, we don't have any structural advantage in China," Cheung noted. The US food giant continues to expand its business map in China. As of the end of June in 2024, there were over 6,000 restaurants and over 200,000 employees in the market. China has become the second largest and fastest-growing market of McDonald's. In 2023, McDonald's China unveiled the ambition of operating 10,000 restaurants by 2028. To support this, McDonald's and its suppliers have invested over 12 billion yuan from between 2018 to 2023 to develop new production capacities and enhance supply chain sustainability. Observers said that the industrial park reflect foreign companies' confidence in operating in China as the country takes concrete measures in furthering reform and opening-up. China's foreign direct investment from January to May 2024 reached 412.51 billion yuan, with the number of newly-established foreign-backed companies reaching 21,764, rising by 17.4 percent year-on-year, data from China's Ministry of Commerce revealed. According to a recent survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in China, the majority of US companies saw improved profitability in China in 2023, and half of the survey participants put China as their first choice or within their top three investment destinations globally. Olaf Korzinovski, EVP of Volkswagen China, who is responsible for production and components, also shared his understanding of supply chains in China with the Global Times. Volkswagen has been operating in China for about 40 years. "In order to seize greater value for our customers," Volkswagen Group is stepping up pace of innovation in China, and systematically purshing forward the digitalization process, Korzinovski noted, adding the company is strengthening local capabilities with accelerated decision-making efficiency. Global Times

A couple of days ago, a Quad summit meeting in Sydney scheduled for May 24 was abruptly canceled. The US president had to pull out of his long-anticipated trip to Australia and Papua New Guinea. Instead, the heads of the four Quad member states got together on the margins of the G7 Summit in Hiroshima on May 20. The main reason for the change of plans was the continuous struggle between the White House and Republicans on the Hill over the national debt ceiling. If no compromise is reached, the US federal government might fail to meet its financial commitments already in June; such a technical default would have multiple negative repercussions for the US, as well as for the global economy and finance at large. Let us hope that a compromise between the two branches of US power will be found and that the ceiling of the national debt will be raised once again. However, this rather awkward last-minute cancellation of the Quad summit reflects a fundamental US problem - a growing imbalance between the US geopolitical ambitions and the fragility of the national financial foundation to serve these ambitions. The Biden administration appears to be fully committed to bringing humankind back to the unipolar world that existed right after the end of the Cold War some 30 years ago, but the White House no longer has enough resources at its disposal to sustain such an undertaking. As they say in America: You cannot not have champagne on a beer budget. The growing gap between the ends that the US seeks in international relations and the means that it has available is particularly striking in the case of the so-called dual containment policy that Washington now pursues toward Russia and China. Even half a century ago, when the US was much stronger in relative terms than it is today, the Nixon administration realized that containing both Moscow and Beijing simultaneously was not a good idea: "Dual containment" would imply prohibitively high economic costs for the US and would result in too many unpredictable political risks. The Nixon administration decided to focus on containing the Soviet Union as the most important US strategic adversary of the time. This is why Henry Kissinger flew to Beijing in July 1971 to arrange the first US-China summit in February 1972 leading to a subsequent rapid rapprochement between the two nations. In the early days of the Biden administration, it seemed that the White House was once again trying to avoid the unattractive "dual containment" option. The White House rushed to extend the New START in January 2021 and held an early US-Russia summit meeting five months later in Geneva. At that point many analysts predicted that Biden would play Henry Kissinger in reverse - that is he would try to peace with the relatively weaker opponent (Moscow) in order to focus on containing the stronger one (Beijing). However, after the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it became clear that no accommodation with the Kremlin was on Biden's mind any longer. Still, having decided to take a hard-line stance toward Moscow and to lead a broad Western coalition in providing military and economic assistance to Kiev, Washington has not opted for a more accommodative or at least a more flexible policy toward Beijing. On the contrary, over last year one could observe a continuous hardening of the US' China policy - including granting more political and military support to the Taiwan island, encouraging US allies and partners in Asia to increase their defense spending, engaging in more navel activities in the Pacific and imposing more technology sanctions on China. In the meantime, economic and social problems within the US are mounting. The national debt ceiling is only the tip of an iceberg - the future of the American economy is now clouded by high US Federal Reserve interest rates that slow down growth, feed unemployment and might well lead to a recession. Moreover, the US society remains split along the same lines it was during the presidency of Donald Trump. The Biden administration has clearly failed to reunite America: Many of the social, political, regional, ethnic and even generational divisions have got only deeper since January 2021. It is hard to imagine how a nation divided so deeply and along so many lines could demonstrate continuity and strategic vision in its foreign policy, or to allocate financial resources needed to sustain a visionary and consistent global leadership. Of course, the "dual containment" policy is not the only illustration of the gap between the US ambitions and its resources. The same gap inevitably pops up at every major forum that the US conducts with select groups of countries from the Global South - Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America or the Middle East. The Biden administration has no shortage of arguments warning these countries about potential perils of cooperating with Moscow or Beijing, but it does not offer too many plausible alternatives that would showcase the US generosity, its strategic vision, and its true commitment to the burning needs of the US interlocutors. To cut it short, Uncle Sam brings lots of sticks to such meetings, but not enough carrots to win the audience. In sum, US foreign policy under President Joe Biden reminds people of a very advanced and highly sophisticated smartphone that has a rather weak battery, which is not really energy efficient. The proud owner of the gadget has to look perennially for a power socket in order not to have the phone running out of power at any inappropriate moment. Maybe the time has come for the smartphone owner to look for another model that would have fewer fancy apps, but a stronger and a more efficient battery, which will make the appliance more convenient and reliable.

RS e-tron GT: Shares J1 platform with Porsche Taycan. The iconic closed hexagonal "big mouth" is quite a brand recognition, and the rear of the car uses a decorative design shaped like a diffuser. Although the difference between it and the regular e-tron GT is very limited, the "RS" nameplate on the rear of the car means that it is not an ordinary person, of course, low-key is also the style of AUD-Sport. The center console continues the family design of the Audi brand, the lines are simple and refined, and the center control screen, the front air conditioning control panel and the function keys below are obviously tilted to the driver's side, echoing the product positioning of the driver's car. Sports seats, leather fabrics with red stitches, etc. appear in the configuration table of the car, rendering the interior sports atmosphere just right, and the overall beauty of the cabin has been affirmed by the reviewers. Although the official model of the cockpit chip selected by the car has not been announced, it has a high score in the evaluation items such as the cold start speed of the car, the start speed of the core application and the navigation search speed, which shows that the car performance is good. In addition, in terms of specifications and accuracy, the car received full marks in the touch accuracy and screen sharpness evaluation, and the daily high-frequency interaction experience is excellent. Of course, if you optimize the voice car control ability, its intelligent experience will be a higher level.

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) recently said that China filed 38,000 artificial intelligtion-related generative AI patents from 2014-23, while the United States filed 6,276 of the 50,000 patents filed by all countries. Of the 50,000 applications, 25 percent were filed last year.The top five inventor regions are: China (38,210 inventions), the United States (6,276 inventions), the Republic of Korea (4,155 inventions), Japan (3,409 inventions) and India (1,350 inventions).

US politicians are advocating for steep tariffs, echoing the protectionist Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922. Despite potential international retaliation, risks to global economic rules and a shift from post-World War II principles, US politicians have promised to increase trade barriers against China, causing concerns for the sustainability of global economic harmony. A century ago, the Republican Congress passed the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922. This post-World War-I effort to protect the US from German competition and rescue America's own businesses from falling prices sparked a global wave of tariff hikes. While long forgotten, echoes of Fordney-McCumber now reverberate across the US political landscape. Once again, politicians are grasping the tariff as a magic talisman against its own economic ills and to contain the rise of China. The Democratic Party of the 1920s opposed tariffs, because duties are harmful to consumers and farmers, but today both President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump favor national delivery through protectionism. Trump promised that his second term, if elected, would impose 60-percent tariffs on everything arriving from China and 10-percent tariffs on imports from the rest of the world, apparently including the imports covered by 14 free trade agreements with America's 20 partners. He initially promised 100-percent tariffs on electric vehicles (EVs), but when Biden declared that he was hiking tariffs on EVs from China to 100-percent, Trump raised the ante to 200-percent. On May 14, 2024, the White House imposed tariffs ranging from 25 percent (on items such as steel, aluminum and lithium batteries) to 50 percent (semiconductors, solar cells, syringes and needles) and 100 percent (electric vehicles) on Chinese imports. US government officials offer "national security" and "supply chain vulnerability" as the justification for levying high tariffs. To deflect worries about inflation, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai declared, "first of all, I think that that link, in terms of tariffs to prices, has been largely debunked." Contrary findings by the United States International Trade Commission and a number of distinguished economists, as well as Biden's own 2019 statement criticizing Trump's tariffs - "Trump doesn't get the basics. He thinks tariffs are being paid by China… [but] the American people are paying his tariffs" - forced Tai's office to wind back her declaration. The fact that prohibitive barriers to imports of solar cells, batteries and EVs will delay the green economy carries zero political weight with Trump and little with Biden. Nor does either of them worry about the prospects of Chinese retaliation and damage to the fabric of global economic rules. Historical lessons - unanticipated consequences of the foolish Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 - are seen as irrelevant by the candidates and their advisers. The US' lurch from its post-World War II free trade principles offers China a golden opportunity. On the world stage, China will espouse open free trade and investment. China will encourage EV and battery firms to establish plants in Europe, Brazil, Mexico and elsewhere, essentially daring the US to damage its own alliances by restricting third country imports containing Chinese components. Whether the fabric of global economic rules that has delivered astounding prosperity to the world will survive through the 21st century remains to be seen. Much will depend on the decisions of other large economic powers, not only China but also the European Union and Japan, as well as middle powers, such as Australia, Brazil, Chile, ASEAN and South Korea. Their actions and reactions will reshape the rules of the 21st century. If others follow America down this costly path, the world will become less prosperous and vastly more unpredictable. If they resist, the US risks being diminished and more isolated. The author is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute of International Economics. bizopinion@globaltimes.com.cn