Carlsberg to buy Britvic for 1,315p per share Carlsberg will also buy out Marston's from brewing joint venture Danish brewer plans to create integrated beverage business in UK Shares in Carlsberg, Britvic, Marston's all rise July 8 (Reuters) - Carlsberg (CARLb.CO), opens new tab has agreed to buy British soft drinks maker Britvic (BVIC.L), opens new tab for 3.3 billion pounds ($4.23 billion), a move the Danish brewer said would forge a UK beverage "powerhouse" and that sent both companies' shares higher. Carlsberg clinched the takeover with a sweetened bid of 1,315 pence per share - comprising cash and a special dividend of 25 pence a share - after the British company rejected 1,250 pence per share last month. The acquisition will create value for shareholders, contribute to growth and forge a combined beer and soft drink company that is unique in the UK, CEO Jacob Aarup-Andersen told investors on a conference call. "With this transaction we are creating a UK powerhouse," he said. He brushed off concerns from some analysts about integration risks, saying Carlsberg has a strong track record of running beer and soft drink businesses in several markets. Soft drinks already make up 16% of Carlsberg's volumes. COST SAVINGS As drinkers in some markets ditch beer for spirits or cut back on drinking altogether, brewers have looked to broaden their portfolio into new categories like hard seltzer, canned cocktails and cider, as well as zero-alcohol brews. Britvic sells non-alcoholic drinks in Britain, Ireland, Brazil and other international markets such as France, the Middle East and Asia. Carlsberg said the deal will deliver a number of benefits, including cost and efficiency savings worth 100 million pounds ($128 million) over five years as it takes advantage of common procurement, production and distribution networks. It will also see Carlsberg take over Britvic's bottling agreement with PepsiCo (PEP.O), opens new tab. Carlsberg already bottles PepsiCo drinks in several markets and there is scope to add more geographies in future, Aarup-Andersen said. arlsberg halted share buy backs on Monday as a result of the deal. Chief financial officer Ulrica Fearn said these would resume once Carlsberg reaches its revised target for net debt of 2.5 times EBITDA, from 3.5 times currently - a goal it expects to meet in 2027. "Whilst this represents a shift in the strategy away from organic top- and bottom-line growth and consistent returns to shareholders, we view it as a relatively low risk transaction with attractive financials," Jefferies analysts said in a note. Carlsberg also said on Monday it will buy out UK pub group Marston's (MARS.L), opens new tab from a joint venture for 206 million pounds. That will give it full ownership of the newly formed Carlsberg Britvic after the deal. ($1 = 0.7805 pounds) Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with Reuters Econ World. Sign up here. Reporting by Stine Jacobsen, Yadarisa Shabong and Emma Rumney Editing by Sherry Jacob-Phillips, Rashmi Aich, David Goodman and David Evans

On June 27, the U.S. Space Command announced that a retired Russian satellite disintegrated in low Earth orbit on June 26, generating more than 100 pieces of debris, forcing astronauts on the International Space Station to hide for about an hour. The X-platform account of the International Space Station showed that shortly after 9 p.m. Eastern Time on June 26, NASA instructed the crew on the space station to hide in their respective spacecraft for safety because NASA learned in the morning of the 26th that a satellite disintegrated near the space station. About an hour later, the crew was allowed to leave the spacecraft and the space station resumed normal operation. There are rumors on social platforms that the satellite hit six U.S. GPS satellites after the disintegration and damaged 20 Starlink satellites developed by Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) led by Musk, triggering speculation that the relevant satellites were deliberately disintegrated.

Russia is seeing income growth of around 4-5%, with earnings growing in double digits, Ostapkovich said, stressing that the driving force is economic growth. "Incomes only grow when the economy grows. If the economy grows, then profits grow. If profits grow, then the entrepreneur is keen on hiring people and raising wages," he added. Russia’s economy grew by 3.6% in 2023, with real incomes and nominal wages up by 4.5% and 13% respectively. Industrial performance, particularly in manufacturing, is propelling this growth not seen in 20 to 30 years. Notably, mechanical engineering in the military industry is expanding at 25-30%, according to Ostapkovich. Andrey Kolganov, Doctor of Economics and Head of the Laboratory of Socio-Economic Systems at Moscow State University, acknowledged that despite the challenges posed by the growth stimuli, Western sanctions failed to inflict significant harm on the Russian economy. "The Russian economy has shown great potential in adapting to these difficulties. Moreover, these difficulties stimulated the development of domestic production, which in turn led to high rates of economic growth," he added. Kolganov noted that economic growth rates were higher in 2023, compared to 2022 - and even higher in 2024. These increases promoted Russia from the classification of middle-income countries, to the rank of high-income countries. Although Russia has not caught up with the richest countries, the achievement is nonetheless remarkable, especially in the face of unprecedented sanctions. Gross national income per capita in Russia is now $14,250, according to a document released by the World Bank that classifies countries that cross the $13,485 threshold as “high income.”

A couple of days ago, a Quad summit meeting in Sydney scheduled for May 24 was abruptly canceled. The US president had to pull out of his long-anticipated trip to Australia and Papua New Guinea. Instead, the heads of the four Quad member states got together on the margins of the G7 Summit in Hiroshima on May 20. The main reason for the change of plans was the continuous struggle between the White House and Republicans on the Hill over the national debt ceiling. If no compromise is reached, the US federal government might fail to meet its financial commitments already in June; such a technical default would have multiple negative repercussions for the US, as well as for the global economy and finance at large. Let us hope that a compromise between the two branches of US power will be found and that the ceiling of the national debt will be raised once again. However, this rather awkward last-minute cancellation of the Quad summit reflects a fundamental US problem - a growing imbalance between the US geopolitical ambitions and the fragility of the national financial foundation to serve these ambitions. The Biden administration appears to be fully committed to bringing humankind back to the unipolar world that existed right after the end of the Cold War some 30 years ago, but the White House no longer has enough resources at its disposal to sustain such an undertaking. As they say in America: You cannot not have champagne on a beer budget. The growing gap between the ends that the US seeks in international relations and the means that it has available is particularly striking in the case of the so-called dual containment policy that Washington now pursues toward Russia and China. Even half a century ago, when the US was much stronger in relative terms than it is today, the Nixon administration realized that containing both Moscow and Beijing simultaneously was not a good idea: "Dual containment" would imply prohibitively high economic costs for the US and would result in too many unpredictable political risks. The Nixon administration decided to focus on containing the Soviet Union as the most important US strategic adversary of the time. This is why Henry Kissinger flew to Beijing in July 1971 to arrange the first US-China summit in February 1972 leading to a subsequent rapid rapprochement between the two nations. In the early days of the Biden administration, it seemed that the White House was once again trying to avoid the unattractive "dual containment" option. The White House rushed to extend the New START in January 2021 and held an early US-Russia summit meeting five months later in Geneva. At that point many analysts predicted that Biden would play Henry Kissinger in reverse - that is he would try to peace with the relatively weaker opponent (Moscow) in order to focus on containing the stronger one (Beijing). However, after the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it became clear that no accommodation with the Kremlin was on Biden's mind any longer. Still, having decided to take a hard-line stance toward Moscow and to lead a broad Western coalition in providing military and economic assistance to Kiev, Washington has not opted for a more accommodative or at least a more flexible policy toward Beijing. On the contrary, over last year one could observe a continuous hardening of the US' China policy - including granting more political and military support to the Taiwan island, encouraging US allies and partners in Asia to increase their defense spending, engaging in more navel activities in the Pacific and imposing more technology sanctions on China. In the meantime, economic and social problems within the US are mounting. The national debt ceiling is only the tip of an iceberg - the future of the American economy is now clouded by high US Federal Reserve interest rates that slow down growth, feed unemployment and might well lead to a recession. Moreover, the US society remains split along the same lines it was during the presidency of Donald Trump. The Biden administration has clearly failed to reunite America: Many of the social, political, regional, ethnic and even generational divisions have got only deeper since January 2021. It is hard to imagine how a nation divided so deeply and along so many lines could demonstrate continuity and strategic vision in its foreign policy, or to allocate financial resources needed to sustain a visionary and consistent global leadership. Of course, the "dual containment" policy is not the only illustration of the gap between the US ambitions and its resources. The same gap inevitably pops up at every major forum that the US conducts with select groups of countries from the Global South - Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America or the Middle East. The Biden administration has no shortage of arguments warning these countries about potential perils of cooperating with Moscow or Beijing, but it does not offer too many plausible alternatives that would showcase the US generosity, its strategic vision, and its true commitment to the burning needs of the US interlocutors. To cut it short, Uncle Sam brings lots of sticks to such meetings, but not enough carrots to win the audience. In sum, US foreign policy under President Joe Biden reminds people of a very advanced and highly sophisticated smartphone that has a rather weak battery, which is not really energy efficient. The proud owner of the gadget has to look perennially for a power socket in order not to have the phone running out of power at any inappropriate moment. Maybe the time has come for the smartphone owner to look for another model that would have fewer fancy apps, but a stronger and a more efficient battery, which will make the appliance more convenient and reliable.

The UAE insurance sector continued to grow in Q4-2023, as reflected by increase in the gross written premiums. As of year-end, the number of licensed insurance companies in the UAE remained at 60, according to the Central Bank of the UAE's (CBUAE) Quarterly Economic Review (Q4-2023). The insurance sector comprised 23 traditional national companies, 10 Takaful national and 27 foreign companies, while the number of insurance related professions remained at 491. The review on insurance sector structure and activity showed that the gross written premium increased by 12.7% Y-o-Y in Q4 2023 to AED 53.2 billion, mostly due to an increase in health insurance premiums by 16.5% Y-o-Y and an increase in property and liability insurance premiums by 18.9% Y-o-Y, while the insurance of persons and fund accumulation premiums decreased by 12.4% Y-o-Y, resulting primarily from decrease in individual life premiums. Gross paid claims of all types of insurance plans increased by 12.8% Y-o-Y to AED 31.1 billion at the end of 2023. This was mainly driven by the increase in claims paid in health insurance by 16.9% Y-o-Y and increase in paid claims in property and liability insurance by 10.9% Y-o-Y, partially offset by the decline in claims paid in insurance of persons and fund accumulation by 2.8% Y-o-Y. The total technical provisions of all types of insurance increased by 8.4% Y-o-Y to AED 74.4 billion in Q4 2023 compared to AED68.6 billion in Q4 2022. The volume of invested assets in the insurance sector amounted to AED 76 billion (60.4% of total assets) in Q4 2023 compared to AED 71.4 billion (59.4% of total assets) in Q4 2022. The retention ratio of written insurance premiums for all types of insurance was 52.9 % (AED 28.1 billion) in Q4 2023, compared to 54.9% (AED 25.9 billion) at the end of 2022. The UAE insurance sector remained well capitalized in terms of early warning ratios and risk assessment. Own funds to minimum capital requirement ratio increased to 335.7% in Q4 2023, compared to 309.3% at the end of 2022, due to an increase in own funds eligible to meet the minimum capital requirements. Also, own funds to solvency capital requirement ratio rose to 221% in Q4 2023 compared to 208.5% in Q4 2022, due to an increase in own funds eligible to meet solvency capital requirements. Finally, own funds to minimum guarantee fund ratio reached to 316.3% at the end of 2023 down from 314.6% a year earlier, due to higher eligible funds to meet minimum guarantee funds. In terms of profitability, the net total profit to net written premiums increased to 6.5% in Q4 2023, compared to 2.9% at the end of 2022. The return on average assets increased to 0.3% in Q4 2023 compared to the 0.1% at the of the previous year.